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*Malthus, Darwin, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Ibn Khaldûn:
On Human Species Survival.*

By Walter L. Wallace

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The following is **NEW CHAPTER 5**, examining **HERBERT SPENCER'S** theory of human society and to be added to the above book. (Old chapter 5 in that book becomes new chapter 6, and old chapter 6 becomes new chapter 7.) The new chapter 5, below, was recently written by the author of the above book. All references cited in **NEW CHAPTER 5** are listed in that book. My thanks to Danny Frohman, a student of mine many years ago, for the gift of a first edition of Spencer's 3-volume *Principles of Sociology*. And thanks to Sarane Boocock for reading this new chapter.

NEW CHAPTER 5

SPENCER'S SUPPLEMENTARY THEORY: WARS BETWEEN SOCIETIES

All the theories examined in this book so far focus on sociocultural phenomena that occur *inside* individual human societies. Our final two theories, however—Herbert Spencer's (1820-1903—we too-quickly addressed his theory in note 3 of old chapter 5), and to a lesser degree Abdurahman Muhammad Ibn Khaldûn's (1332-1406—see especially page 144 in the book), pay main attention to sociocultural events that occur *between* societies.

For both Ibn Khaldûn and Spencer, the between-society sociocultural events of interest are *wars*, and we certainly have to pay attention to such events when we are concerned with human species survival—especially when species extinction has become one of war’s realistically possible outcomes¹.

It is *wars*, Spencer claims—not biological reproduction, not migration, not the division of labor, not religion, economics, politics, or education—that have been the principal determining sociocultural phenomena of human history so far. But war’s dominance will not go on forever. *Peaceful industry* will increasingly share in that dominance—until *industry*, not war, eventually determines the rest of human history.

Spencer’s essential argument, then, is this: “*War ... in the slow course of things, brings about a social aggregation which furthers that industrial state at variance with war; and yet nothing but war could bring about this social aggregation [W]ithout war large aggregates of men cannot be formed, and ... without large aggregates of men there cannot be a developed industrial state*” (1961, 176)—and he also claims that without a developed industrial state there can be no end to wars between states: “persistent war is at variance not only with industrial development but also with the higher intellectual developments that aid industry and are aided by it” (1961, 179).

Thus, Spencer says, although

during barbarism and the earlier stages of civilization, war has the effect of exterminating the weaker societies and of weeding out the weaker members of the stronger societies².... [Y]et during the later stages of

civilization.... the tendency is to pick out and expose to slaughter the best-grown and healthiest: leaving behind the physically inferior to propagate the race.... War [then] ... becomes a cause of retrogression.... [T]he direct effect of war on industrial progress is [also] repressive.... as necessitating the [moving into military positions] of men and materials that would otherwise go to industrial growth (1961, 178-179).

Moreover, he adds, “perpetually warlike activities repress sympathy [and] cultivate aggressiveness to the extent of making it a pleasure to inflict injury.... In proportion as giving pain to others is made a habit during war, it will remain a habit during peace ... tending towards a disorder that calls for coercive government. Nothing like a high type of social life is possible without a type of human character in which the promptings of egoism are duly restrained by regard for others” (1961:179).

In the beginning, then, Spencer says war is a supremely *good* thing for human species evolution—as good a thing as ecological diversity is in Darwin’s view of all life’s evolution—but Spencer says war eventually turns into an unrelievedly *bad* thing for human evolution.

WAR AND EVOLUTION IN SOCIETAL SIZE AND COMPLEXITY

War is, in Spencer’s view, not a species-inherited *individual* reaction pattern (‘fight or flight,’ the ‘stress response’) but a *sociocultural invention*: “While there exist only small, wandering, unorganized hordes, the conflicts of these with one another [bring

about] no permanent changes of arrangement in them. But when there have arisen the definite chieftainships which *frequent conflicts* tend to initiate, and especially when the conflicts have ended in *subjugations* [a point to which we shall return toward the end of this chapter], there arise the rudiments of [permanent] *political organization*” (1898, I, 12), and “*Everywhere ... wars ... originate governmental structures, and are causes of all such improvements in those structures as increase the efficiency of corporate action against environing societies*” (1898, I, 520; see also 524, 557).

We are thus led to conclude that the chief of a given prehistoric tribe (who might have thought to himself ‘I am the decider for this tribe and I can gain still more power if I take the tribe to war—at little risk to myself’) might experience a sudden desire to bring some neighboring tribe’s “units [that is, its human population] and ... the conditions under which they exist [including] *climate*.... [land] *surface* the *Flora* of [its] region ... [and] its *Fauna*” (1898, I, 8-9) under his own chiefly control, and may also desire control of the neighboring society’s “secondary or derived set of factors [of social structure, culture structure, and technology], which social evolution itself brings into play” (1898, I, 9; see 9-14). Driven by such socioculturally-induced appetites, attack and conquest of a neighboring society may result, and “When a *compound* society has been *consolidated* by the cooperation of its component groups in war under a single head ... *the compound society becomes practically a single one,*” so that whether “by conquest or by federation in war [a society] of the *double-compound* type” (1898, I, 555) may be formed. In other words, two or more small primitive societies may become joined by conquest, or in federation for conquest, into one larger society, and then two or more of

these larger societies may become joined into one—and so on, slowly and bloodily up over their enemies’ and also their comrades’ corpses, toward eventual globality.

Spencer summarizes this increase of a society’s population by successive compoundings in an emphatically deterministic principle: “The primitive social group ... *never* attains any considerable size by simple increase,” he says, “the formation of a larger society results *only* by the joining of ... smaller societies” (1898, I, 466-467); and that “repetition of the process on a larger scale produces *doubly*-compound societies” (1898, I, 468) adding that “[t]he stages of compounding and re-compounding *have to be passed through in succession*” (1898, I, 555)³.

Not only is the conquering society’s population *size* increased by war, its population *complexity* increases at the same time: “As we progress from small groups to larger; from single groups to compound groups; from compound groups to doubly-compound ones, the unlikenesses of parts increase. The social aggregate, homogeneous when minute, habitually gains in heterogeneity along with each increment of growth; and to reach great size must acquire great complexity” (1898, I, 471)—including, we would add, the complexity of culture structure. In such population-generated complications of structure, “A dominant class [arises and] ... assumes control over the rest; and when this class separates into the more and the less dominant [parts thereof], these ... begin to discharge distinct parts of the entire control” (1898, I, 450). To this, Spencer then adds that “This division of labor ... in the society, as in the [individual] animal, *makes it a*

living whole [and] ... in respect of this fundamental trait, a social organism and an individual organism are entirely alike" (1898, I, 452).

Moreover, Spencer says, "Along with [the] *natural* government [that is, of mortal chiefs and mortal chiefs of chiefs] there goes [sic] a like form of *supernatural* government.... I refer to the *militant character of the religion*.... [which] is a religion of *enmity*. The duty of blood-revenge ... continues to be the dominant duty [on both sides of a war] as the militant type of society evolves" (1898, I, 559)⁴—and this is a quite different, because much more *intersocietal*, view from Durkheim's *intra-societal*, *interpersonal*, view of religion.

But against his claim, cited just above, of the 'entire *likeness*' of social organisms and individual organisms in their mutual possessions of divisions of labor, Spencer also points out certain supposed *unlikenesses*. Although social organisms—because they do not form "*concrete*" wholes as do individual organisms—"cannot maintain cooperation by means of *physical* influences directly propagated from part to part," he says, "yet they can and do maintain cooperation by.... *emotional language and by language, oral and written, of the intellect*" (1898, I, 459-460; see also 13). Spencer's idea here that *psychical symbolic* language may *substitute* for "physical influences" in bringing about the same effect constitutes a rare departure from his more basic determinism (i.e., one-cause-one-effect, one-effect-one-cause). It overlooks, however, that the communication of psychically-interpreted, symbols always involves the passing of *physical influences* (sound, writing, print, puffs of smoke, etc.) from sender to receiver and so, in this sense,

involves no *substitution* of psychical for physical influences—only an often complicated psychical *augmentation* of the latter influences.

Spencer’s mention here of “language,” however, shows that his theory connects to all the others that we have already examined here which posit both *cultural structure* and social structure as essential constituents of human sociocultural phenomena. So, Spencer says, “For coordinating the actions of an aggregate, individual or social, there must not only be a governing center, but there must also be *media of communication* through which this center may affect the parts” (1898, I, 533)—and “what is in its early stage a slow propagation of impulses from unit to unit ... becomes, as we advance, a more rapid propagation along settled lines: so making quick and definitely-adjusted combinations [of sociocultural factors] possible” (1898, I, 535). To this, we would add that there should also be media of communication through which the parts report back to the center the extent to which the center’s projected effect has been accomplished so that the center may decide to correct or abandon that effect and move on to its next decision.

THE MILITANT AND INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS

“[A]long with maintenance of an aggregate approaching to, or exceeding, a hundred, we ordinarily find a simple or compound *ruling* agency—one or more men claiming and exercising authority that is natural, or supernatural, or both. *This is the first social differentiation*. Soon after [this differentiation],” Spence says, “there frequently comes *another*, tending to form a division between regulative and operative parts” (1898, I, 472)—but here Spencer merely seems to repeat himself with the same differentiation referred to twice.

In any case, however, Spencer gives us no descriptive name for what he calls vaguely “*another*” social differentiation here, but he does say that “In the lowest tribes [it] is rudely represented ... by the *contrast in status between the sexes: the men carry on such external activities as ... war; while the women are made drudges who perform the less skilled parts of the process of sustentation*” (1898, I, 472; see also 594).

Occupational *sex-role* differentiation between the militant (male) and industrial {male and female) systems, then, seems to be the descriptive term Spencer wants for what he terms “another” social differentiation—and perhaps, living in his more patriarchal era in the West, because he has specified that the differentiation is a sex-role one he also confuses it with the difference between “regulative” and “operative.”

Referring to militant and industrial roles together, Spencer goes on to tell us that “while [these] two systems ... coexist in all but the rudimentary forms [of societies], they vary immensely in the ratios they bear to one another. In some cases the structures carrying on external actions are largely developed; the sustaining system exists solely for their benefit; and the activities [as a whole may be called] *militant*. In other cases there is a predominance of the structures carrying on sustentation; offensive and destructive structures are maintained only to protect them; and the activities [as a whole may be called] *industrial*” (1898, I, 556-557). One societal system for *taking*, then, and another for *making*—and their proportions may vary widely.

TWO SUBSYSTEMS FOR CULTURE STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURAL MEDIATION BETWEEN PARTS OF SOCIETY

Now, having identified the militant and industrial systems as being characterized by a sociocultural *sex-role* differentiation, Spencer introduces two apparently *non-sex-role*-differentiated subsystems that mediate between these and other parts of human society.

Speaking of the first mediating subsystem, Spencer says “For carrying on [any] mutually-dependent actions, it is requisite that *impulses, adjusted in their kinds, amounts, and times, shall be conveyed from part to part*. This requisite is fulfilled in.... societies by the [physical] signs of [psychical] feelings and thoughts, conveyed from person to person.... [Thus] the *inter-nuncial* [that is, the message-transmitting-and-receiving, culture structural] function ... [is] achieved by *language*—emotional and intellectual” (1898, I, 460). It is through this “inter-nuncial system ... [that] various industrial structures receive from one another stimuli or checks caused by rises or falls in the consumptions of their respective products; and through which they jointly receive a stimulus when there is suddenly an extra consumption for war purposes” (1898, I, 545).

And, as almost any international tourist knows very well, it does seem to be differences in *language* that most prevents individual members of different societies from interacting freely with each other. For that reason, Figure 5.1, below, represents Spencer’s “inter-nuncial” function as tending to integrate the *entire* society culture structurally—down to its individual participants—and to separate it from other societies.

There is, however, also a second subsystem that Spencer says performs an equally important but different mediation. Here, “after the outer [militant] and inner [industrial] systems have been marked off from one another, there begins to arise a *third system, lying between the two [primary systems] and facilitating their cooperation*. Mutual dependence ... implies intermediation; and in proportion [as the primary two systems] develop, the apparatus for *exchanging products and influences* [between them] must develop too” (1898, I, 494). Spencer calls this product-exchanging (and, vaguely, also “influence” exchanging) subsystem the “*distributing system*” (1898, I, 494-497, 505-518), and says that “as fast as [the warlike] consolidation of [simple] tribes makes possible the *localization of industries* ... an appliance for *transferring commodities* [between these localities and others]; consisting now of single hawkers, now of traveling companies of traders, and growing with the formation of roads into an organized system of wholesale and retail distribution ... spreads everywhere” (1898, I, 495). Indeed, this subsystem operates not only between the militant and industrial systems, but “where there exists only a class of masters [rulers] and a class of slaves [operatives], an appliance for *transferring products has no place*; but a larger society having classes exercising various regulative functions, and localities devoted to different industries ... can grow and complicate only on condition that this transferring system makes appropriate advances” (1898, I, 497). This means that Spencer’s “distributing” system also mediates within and between what he calls the “first social differentiation” of regulative and operative agencies and also at levels of differentiation below these agencies—down, again, to the level of individual participants.

Spencer, then, seems clearly to have in mind *two different types of mediations*—one he names the generalized “inter-nuncial” (psychical, culture structural) function and the other the “distributive” (social structural and technological) system—the latter operating both horizontally between the militant and industrial systems, and vertically between regulative and operative agencies within each of those systems—as in Figure 5.1 below. Then, noting that every occupation and every product in the society has both military utility and industrial utility, and also both some regulative and some operative significance (“From the despot down to the slave,” Spencer says, “all [individuals] are masters of those below and subjects of those above” [1898, II, 573]), and also that there may be some transfer of products from one distributing system to the other—we schematize Spencer’s image of a typical modern human society as in Figure 5.1⁵.

[NEW Figure 5.1 about here.]

(Please send a SASE to Professor Walter L. Wallace, Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 for a copy of NEW FIGURE 5.1.)

Now although “Everywhere ... *wars between societies originate government structures,*” because “the holding together of the compound cluster implies a head of the whole [who makes decisions for the entire citizenry, in contrast, say, with plebiscites where the entire citizenry makes its own decisions on such issues] as well as heads of the parts; and a [further] differentiation ... produces a chief of chiefs. Sometimes the combination is made for defense against a common foe, and sometimes it results from

conquest by one tribe of the rest.... [In any event] there results still *greater complexity* in the governing agency, with its king, local rulers, and petty chiefs; and at the same time, there arise more marked divisions of classes—military, priestly, slave, etc. Clearly, then, complication of structure accompanies increase of mass” (1898, I, 473).

This accompaniment of increasing mass by increasing structure in *militant* societies, Spencer says, occurs because “chronic warfare, while requiring subordination throughout the successive grades of an army, also requires subordination of the whole society to the army, for which it serves as a commissariat. It requires, also, subordination throughout the ranks of this commissariat: *graduated subjection [then] is the law of the whole [militant] organization*” (1898, III, 593). In contrast, however, “the modern *industrial* system,” however, “is one under which coerciveness [moves toward] a minimum. Though now the worker is often mercilessly *coerced by circumstances*, and has nothing before him but *hard terms*, yet he is not coerced by *a master* into acceptance of those terms” (1898, III, 587). The master can now tell the worker, ‘It’s not *me*, for any *personal* reason, who is docking or firing you; it’s the *market* that’s doing it, for *its* own *objective* reasons. It works like gravity’

THE TRANSITION FROM MILITANT TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

In what Spencer seems to regard as the final foreseeable sociocultural transformation of human society, he predicts that high-ratio *militant* societies will become high-ratio *industrial* societies—neither of them being *purely* one or the other but only *mainly* so. The “metamorphosis,” Spencer claims, results from a tribe’s “*change*

from a nomadic life to a settled life.... Presently comes a settling down in some fit habitat [Weber would say a habitat having strong culture structural charisma⁶ for that tribe, though the habitat may *not* be objectively “fit” for the tribe], a dwindling away of the locomotive organs and the [movement-] guiding appliances ... a growth of those other organs now needed for appropriating such food as the [now constant ecological] environment supplies, and a rapid enlargement of the sustaining system” (1898, I, 576).

Such a thorough social structural and culture structural change cannot be made all at once (Spencer says “the transition to settled agricultural communities is very gradual” [1898, I, 579]), and it cannot be made without resistance from defenders of the tribe’s long-established nomadism: “Thus we have the [sacred injunction of the nomadic Rechabites that] ‘Neither shall you build house, nor sow corn, nor plant vineyard, nor have any, but all your days ye shall dwell in tents’” (1898, I, 578). But gradually, and with occasional backslidings into militant activities, a fundamental culture structural change occurs. That is to say, instead of

the doctrine that the duty of *obedience to the governing agent is unqualified*, there arises the doctrine that *the will of the citizens is supreme and the governing agency exists merely to carry out their will....* With these changes of political theory and accompanying sentiment, is formed a belief ... that the combined actions of the social aggregate have for their end to maintain the conditions under which individual lives may be satisfactorily carried on; in place of the old belief that individual lives have for their end the maintenance of this aggregate’s combined

actions.... This relation, in which the mutual rendering of services is unforced and neither individual [whether master or workman, buyer or seller of commodities, or professional man and those they aid] is subordinated, becomes the predominant relation throughout society in proportion as the industrial activities predominate.... There results a type characterized throughout by that same *individual freedom which every commercial transaction implies* (1898, I, 568-569).

So where Marx tells us that *nonhuman robots* will eventually take over what has long been the *human* labor process (see chapter 3), Spencer tells us that the *industrial* system will eventually take over that basic determination of human society which has long been the prerogative of the *militant* system. Note, however, that Spencer's conclusion that "every commercial transaction implies ... individual freedom" is not a conclusion that Marx would have drawn. Coercion alone, Marx would say, whether by "merciless ... circumstances" or by "hard terms" is enough to deny the worker "individual freedom."

For the existence of what Spencer regards as an evolutionarily advanced, industry-dominated, "individual freedom," type of society, with all its "merciless ... circumstances" and "hard terms" he claims that several kinds of causes—none of them sociocultural revolution—must occur together. First is

the deeply organized character of the particular *race*, coming down from ... prehistoric times during which the diffusion of mankind and differentiation of the varieties of man, took place.... There is, next, the effect due to the *immediately-preceding mode of life and social type*....

[And] there are the peculiarities of the *habitat* in respect of contour, soil, climate, flora, fauna, severally affecting in one mode or the other the activities, whether militant or industrial.... Yet further, there are the complications caused by the particular organizations and practices of *surrounding societies*.... [Finally, there is the] *mixture of races caused by conquest or otherwise* (1898, I, 569-570—and we must say that Spencer’s “race” remarks sound many years dated to us, but his “diffusion of mankind” and “differentiation of the varieties of man” sounds up-to-date).

The coincidence of these many factors, Spencer argues, initiates a gradual transition from militant society to industrial society. Without that coincidence, however, the implication is that a society will continue militant into the indefinite future unless it is ‘subjugated’ by some neighboring society—a point to which, again, we shall return.

SPENCER’S PREDICTION OF A FUTURE, TYPE OF HUMAN SOCIETY

Not all the above listed factors, however, carry equal causal weight. The central determining factor is still *warfare* for Spencer—i.e., “the particular organizations and practices of surrounding societies”—and if warfare entails hard, coercive, government, he says, “*decrease of warfare brings relaxation*. The [presumably innate] desire of everyone to use his powers for his *own* advantage [and not for his chief’s or his society’s advantage] ... begins to have its effect as militancy declines.... [which entails an essential cultural structural change, namely, at] one extreme, loyalty is the supreme virtue and disobedience [is] a crime. At the other extreme, servile submission is held

contemptible and maintenance of freedom [is] the cardinal trait of manhood” (1898, III, 593)⁷. “[T]he possibility of a high social state, political as well as general,” Spencer declares, “*fundamentally depends on the cessation of war....* the conclusion of profoundest moment to which all lines of argument converge,” he says, is that “political institutions ... will be molded in this way or in that according as there is frequent war or habitual peace” (1898, II, 663, 665, 648).

It follows, then, that “As, when small tribes were welded into great tribes, the head chief stopped inter-tribal warfare [presumably, by his inter-nuncial mediation, with or without the use of intervening police force]; as, when small feudal governments became subject to a king, feudal wars were prevented by him; so, in time to come, a *federation of the highest nations ... may ... put an end to the re-barbarization [with which wars are] continually undoing civilization*” (1898, II, 610).

Warlike re-barbarization, however, threatens for another reason as well: because “a structure [originally formed] for *defensive* action, [is] available also for *offensive* action.... So is it now with ourselves [says Spencer, an Englishman living in the heyday of the British Empire]. In China, India, Polynesia, Africa, the East Indian Archipelago, reasons ... are given for widening our empire: without force if it may be, and with force if needful.... [Since a] British traveler, sacred wherever he may choose to intrude, shall have his death avenged on someone, we everywhere find pretexts for quarrels which lead to acquisitions” (1898, I, 581, 582). From which it seems fair to conclude, that the

“federation” Spencer mentions must be guarded against the retrogression of any presumably “defensive” police force it possesses into an attacking, conquering, one.

Meantime, Spencer says, whether in war or in peace, “The chief of chiefs begins to acquire *helpers in carrying on control*. He gathers around him some who get information, some with whom he consults, some who execute his commands. No longer a governing unit, he becomes the nucleus in a cluster of governing units” (1898, I, 529). As a result, “the original political head ... falls more and more into the hands of [his] agents—has his judgments in great degree made for him by informers and advisers, and his deputed acts modified by executive officers: *the ministry begins to rule through the original ruler*” (1898, I, 532-533). The rest, Weber would say, is bureaucracy—so it, too, must be guarded against its own retrogressions toward militancy.

Underlying the *sociocultural* (and, for us in the 21st century, increasingly technological) phenomena of war and peace, however, Spencer argues there exist the biologically *innate* qualities of our species. “[P]olitical institutions,” Spencer says, “cannot be effectively modified faster than the characters of the citizens are modified” (1898, II, 661; see also III, 19). At the same time, however, “*Industrial habits ... are indirectly brought about by ... the integration of societies effected by war.... The power of working continuously ... could be established [not by innate qualities but] only by that persistent coercion to which conquered and enslaved tribes are subject.... [O]nly by a discipline of submission, first to an owner, then to a personal governor, presently to a governor less personal, then to the embodied law proceeding from government, could*

there eventually be reached submission to that code of moral law by which the civilized man is more and more restrained in his dealings with his fellows” (1961,177).

So, if we now return, as twice promised, to the “subjugations” to which Spencer has just again referred we may ask whether he means to imply here that “weaker societies and weaker members of stronger societies,” *when they have been long enough conquered and enslaved*, can be made into stronger societies and stronger individuals than those that were never conquered or enslaved?

In any event, however and whenever it is achieved, Spencer tells us, “the industrial type [will differ] ... widely from the militant type.... All trading activities, whether between masters and workmen, buyers and sellers of commodities, or professional men and those they aid are effected by *free exchange*. For some benefit which A’s business enables him to give, B willingly yields up an *equivalent* benefit: if not in the form of something he has produced, then in the form of money gained by his occupation” (1898, I, 569). But how do A and B determine what constitutes an “equivalent” benefit? And what if they disagree about that equivalency? Spencer does not pose such questions.

Here, then, is Spencer’s forecast of the most far-future type of human society he seems able to have imagined. That society will, he tells us,

having a sustaining system more fully developed than any we know at present ... use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant

organization nor exclusively for material aggrandizement; but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities. As the contrast between the militant and the industrial types, is indicated by inversion of the belief that individuals exist for the benefit of the State into the belief that the State exists for the benefit of individuals; so the contrast between the industrial type and the type likely to be evolved from it, is indicated by inversion of the belief that life is for work into the belief that work is for life (1898, I, 575).

To this, Spencer adds the more specific (and more foreseeable) prediction that women's "position becomes good in proportion as warlike activities are replaced by industrial activities; since, when the men fight while the women work, the difference of occupation is greater than when both are engaged in productive labors, however unlike such labors may be in kind.... With decline of militancy and rise of industrialism ... must go a diminution of the political and domestic disabilities of women" (1898, I, 734, 767).

END

NOTES

¹ Neither Ibn Khaldûn nor Spencer *defines* war, so let us define it as a sociocultural event in which people who participate in one society are killed/captured by participants (soldiers) organized for that purpose in at least one other human society. A central feature of wartime killing/capturing in war is its *categorization*: unlike much *civilian*

murder/kidnapping which is typically personal, *military* killing/capturing typically *ignores non-military personal identities and relationships and regards “comrade” and “enemy” statuses as overriding all others*. It follows that military killing/capturing is a soldier’s response to a learned *discipline* to perform categorical *commands* issued by higher ranking soldiers. Regarding “discipline,” some of Weber’s remarks are useful here (and they also echo Spencer’s militant- and-industrial context): “Military discipline gives birth to all discipline [and] large-scale economic organization is the second great agency which trains men for discipline,” and “military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory” (1978, 1154, 1156). Discipline, Weber says, exists when “the individual is shorn of his natural rhythm as defined by his organism ... [and] is attuned to a new rhythm [Weber does not state any source for that “new” rhythm; such a statement might have involved him in a class analysis of human society as it did Marx] through the functional specialization of muscles and through the creation of an optimal economy of physical effort.... [D]iscipline inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction of political and economic needs is increasingly rationalized,” and discipline “more and more restricts the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated conduct” (1978, 1156).

² Thus, in Spencer’s theory, intersocietal human *warfare* performs the “natural selection” role for the human species that *ecology* plays for all evolving species in Darwin’s theory (see chapter 1).

³ That there may be more than one way to skin a cat (more than one path leading to the same destination) is a possibility not acknowledged by Spencer (or by Malthus, Darwin, Durkheim, Marx, or Ibn Khaldûn—for, except for Weber (who says “The social relationship ... consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a *probability* that there will be a meaningful course of action” [1978, 26-27]), they were all determinists. That possibility is compared with determinism in old chapter 6.

⁴ Here, in his mention of religion, is one of Spencer’s implicit recognitions of culture structure.

⁵ In further complications that play unexplicated and therefore uncertain roles in his overall argument, Spencer also tells us that there is a “*third* regulating system.... [called] *monetary*” (see 1898, I, 545-547), and that “in large societies which have become predominantly industrial, there is added a decentralized *regulating system for the industrial structures*; and this ... acquires at length substantial independence. Finally there arises *for the distributing structures also, an independent controlling agency*” (1898, I, 594-595).

⁶ Implicitly regarding the claims Weber makes about charisma and the sociocultural changes he claims charisma can bring about, Spencer argues that “Before [a great man] can remake his society, his society must make him.... Suppose a [James] Watt, with all

his inventive power, living in a tribe ignorant of iron, or in a tribe that could get only as much iron as a fire blown by hand-bellows will smelt; or suppose him born among ourselves before lathes existed; what chance would there have been of the steam engine?" (1961:31). One is surprised, however, when, only a dozen pages after expressing this position, Spencer tells us that "the character of the aggregate is determined by the characters of the units" (1961:43, see also 44).

⁷ Incidentally, Spencer expresses his opposition to both capitalism and communism as follows: "For [capitalism's] direct defrauding of the many by the few, [communism] substitutes the indirect defrauding of the few by the many: evil proportionate to the inequity being the result in one case as in the other" (1898, II, 663).